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 The practices of contemporary sovereign states, such as the increasingly ubiquitous 
investment in the policing and walling of borders, appear to be paradoxical. As Wendy Brown 
argues in Walled States Waning Sovereignty, the claim that the Westphalian model of clearly 
demarcated nation states is no longer applicable, nor desirable, is met by the growing 
pervasiveness of xenophobic policy.1 Contemporary political theory has become increasingly 
interested in the conclusion that political sovereignty, at least as it has previously been known, 
has reached its political horizon. Whether citing trends of globalization or democratization, 
political theorists and scientists alike have projected beyond this political horizon the fantasy (or 
night mare) of a world without borders. Brown writes, “We have learned, especially from late 
twentieth-century Continental thought, to keep our eye on power’s discursive dross, its 
noncentralized habitus, its noncommodifiable operation and its deterritorialization”2. Some take 
the growth of international systems of cooperation, and the dissolution of previous barriers to 
cooperation to be signs of a universal political community. Others see them as omens of a new 
political empire, operating through increasingly incorporeal yet deadly relations of power. 
Regardless, both fantasies are “perversely answered by the stark physicalism of walls”3. 
 The phenomenon of exceptionalism is analogous to this paradox. Exceptionalism is the 
normalization of the exception. It describes when the exception to the law, or the exception to the 
norm is subjected codification, or are asserted and validated as norms. States and subjects begin 
to identify with their exceptionality, despite the fact exceptionality is valuable because it 
signifies one’s capacity or ability to exceed the norms through which states and subjects are 
identified. Certainly there is a distinction between the law and the norm, yet I would argue that 
                                                
1 Brown, Wendy. Walled states, waning sovereignty. New York: Zone Books, 2010, 20. 
2 Ibid., 81. 
3 Ibid., 1. 
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one result of state exceptionalism is that the law is increasingly treated as a norm. I find post-
colonial and queer theorist Jasbir Puar’s definition of exceptionalism to be instructive. Puar 
writes that “exceptionalism paradoxically signals distinction from (to be unlike, dissimilar) as 
well as excellence (imminence, superiority), suggesting a departure from yet master of linear 
progress”4. In fact, exceptionalism attempts to link superiority over and applicability within 
norms, without eroding the distinction between the two. Exceptionalism can be demonstrated by 
both state’s and individual subjects. The logic of exceptionalism, like many contemporary 
sovereign practices appears conceptually problematic because it is often asserted in terms of the 
norms whose legibility it threatens. Nevertheless, exceptionalism can be an effective way of 
maintaining sovereignty if states and subjects can effectively position themselves in the liminal 
space between the exception and the norm. I aim to show how markers of political progress, such 
as democracy and diasporic identity, which denote a moving beyond investment in strict 
articulations of identity and sovereignty, have become employed as shibboleths of culture and 
politics5. I wish to link these perversions of progressive politics to the question of sovereignty’s 
persistence, a fact called into question by the normalization of different states of exception. 
These states of exception are perhaps most famously theorized by political philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben. In this paper I explore the politics of exceptionalism. How does it work? What work 
does it do? How might we critique exceptionalism, and what problems are encountered in an 
attempt to do so? In response to these questions, I will argue that exceptionalism is effective for 
the very reason that it erodes the intelligibility of those norms through which states and subjects 
tend to assert themselves, and through which critiques of sovereign practices tend to be lodged. 
Exceptionalism is also strategic because it challenges modern theories of the individual and 
                                                
4 Puar, Jasbir K. Terrorist assemblages: Homonationalism in queer times. Duke University Press Books, 2007, 3. 
5 By this I mean to say that certain practices of state and identity politics that are defined by the fact that they 
challenge the exclusiveness of state and identity practices, have become deployed as modalities of exclusion. 
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sovereign subject, because it challenges the assumption that sovereignty is intrinsic to the 
integrity of both. I will argue, however, that this fact is not natural to sovereignty, as some 
theorists argue, but rather is constituted by certain normative structures that are historically and 
politically specific. 
 When the Israeli state fosters lawlessness in the name of securing law at its border, or 
when it “defends democracy” through state practices that abuse human and political rights, these 
actions demonstrate just a few paradoxes ubiquitous to ascendancy of state exceptionalism. 
Consequently, the practices of the state, like those practices of sovereignty and identity observed 
by Puar, assert the sovereignty of a legal, cultural, and political, totality in ways, erode integrity 
of those legal, cultural, and political norms, despite the fact that they continue to profit from the 
legibility lent to them by these norms. In the case of the Israeli state, where sovereignty is 
increasingly articulated according to cultural norms (as Jewish Israeli) and political norms (as 
“liberal” and “democratic”), these two manifestations of exceptionalism cannot be separated.  
 I say “strategic” because in many ways this paper will be concerned with tactics. I 
identify exceptionalism to be highly strategic partially for the reason that it incorporates into its 
own operations the threat or promise of its own dissolution. In this sense, sovereignty 
increasingly operates by playing with its own chronology, by making its future dissolution or 
present incompleteness a norm of its operations. I find that Israeli sovereignty appears to operate 
and condition itself through the threat of its own dissolution, or through the promise of a more 
just form of statehood. In both cases marginalized subjects are blamed for the state’s inability to 
conform to legal and political norms that they have already exceeded6. As I will show, this 
dynamic renders it difficult to etch out a space for effective critique.  
 For many of the thinkers discussed in this paper, and for Giorgio Agamben in particular, 
                                                
6 Ibid., 8.  
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it is the site of the legal indistinction between the law and exception that most clearly 
demonstrates how political sovereignty operates7. For Agamben, the fact that sovereignty 
operates on its own threshold demonstrates the fundamental mode of political sovereignty. The 
Agambenian sovereign acts in ways that confound theories of the natural and unitary subject, and 
yet, despite this, Agamben tends to reduce politically and historically specific phenomena to 
abstract metaphysical qualities. Agamben helps to describe the efficacy of sovereignty as it 
operates through exceptionalism. In doing so he precludes any practice through which 
exceptionalism could be effectively combated in ways that are problematically teleological and 
apolitical.  
 I will be mostly employing theorists who tend to be lumped into the category of the 
“post-structural.” For them, as for Agamben, contemporary sovereignty disproves modern 
theories of the individual and collective subject, demonstrating how sovereignty operates through 
the incomplete, disjointed, enactive, and “roguish” subject8. Exceptionalism appears to be a 
necessary development correlative to the problems incurred by any attempt to maintain the 
sovereignty of a homogeneous entity. Sovereignty requires, paradoxically, as a political 
imperative, the interorization of that which is excluded supposedly for the sake of maintaining 
sovereignty.9 As a result, the sovereignty of the law and the sovereignty specific cultural or 
political identities remain haunted by a perverse intimacy with that which is excluded, and that 
which is posed as a threat to their existence. However, these writers distinguish themselves from 
Agamben, insofar as exceptionalism remains a political tactic and achievement, not a natural fact 
of politics, nor a natural quality of sovereignty.  
                                                
7 Agamben, Giorgio. Homo sacer: Sovereign power and bare life. Stanford University Press, 1998, 25. 
8 Edkins, Jenny, and Véronique Pin-Fat. "The subject of the political." Sovereignty and subjectivity (1999): 1-18, 1. 
9 Habermas, Jürgen, Giovanna Borradori, and Jacques Derrida. Philosophy in a time of terror: Dialogues with 
Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida. University of Chicago Press, 2004, 147. 
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 Many of these theorists advocate for practices of sovereignty and identity that challenge 
reliance on the determinate and complete subject, understanding those transgressions to already 
the mode through which the sovereignty of subjects is maintained. Thus, claims of personal and 
collective sovereignty remain important and potentially radical claims because the legal and 
political sovereignty to wish they lay claim is already operating outside the boundaries of those 
norms10. For these writers, the thematics of the post-structural subject mark the sites where 
existing power relations can be subverted, and yet they also mark the site of their persistence. As 
such, it becomes increasingly important recognize the risk involved in theorizing along these 
lines (a risk that they do seem to be aware of). It is important to recognize the larger historical 
and economic factors of Israeli sovereignty that cannot necessarily be dislodged through 
practices which attempt to play with the intimacy between subversion and subjection or to 
embrace the precarity of political subjecthood and sovereignty already included within its 
continued mobilization. There is, after all, a huge difference between the resistance offered 
against Israeli and Palestinian claims to personal and collective sovereignty given that 
Palestinians and Israeli’s experience dramatically greater levels of privilege and freedom in 
relation to the law, and in relation to cultural and political norms. This difference may implicate, 
among other things, the dictates of global capitalism or the long histories of violence and 
oppression. Much of the thought that I am engaging has the tendency or at least the potential to 
obfuscate this difference. Through the work of Palestinian critic Joseph Massad, I hope to push 
back somewhat against the ethos of these tactics, while still affirming their critical edge.11  
     In my analysis of exceptionalism I will be guided by a series of smaller questions. 
                                                
10 Zivi, Karen. "Rights and the Politics of Performativity." Precarious Politics: Critical Encounters (2008): 157-
169, 165. 
11 Massad, Joseph Andoni. The persistence of the Palestinian question: Essays on Zionism and the Palestinians. 
Taylor & Francis, 2006. 
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What are the risks already present when one makes a claim in response to exceptionalism? 
Consequently, what are the risks of critical theory in this context, and how are those risks 
distributed according to the, greater structural factors that effect but are not necessarily immanent 
to individual, and even collective, political practices. Each section tackles a different marker of 
Israeli sovereignty that also signifies a site of Israeli exceptionalism. The first section will be 
interested in the Israeli laws that more and appear to operate as norms in the face of state 
exceptionalism. The second section will discuss cultural norms, and the third section will discuss 
political norms, and in particular, the Israeli state’s self-identification as “democratic.” Each 
section engages political philosophy that challenges the determinacy of those markers on which 
sovereignty is supposedly contingent, explain how sovereignty persists through this 
indeterminacy, and finally reflect on the prospects for effectively critiquing contemporary 
sovereign practices. These theorists include but are not limited to Giorgio Agamben, Wendy 















Juridical Exceptionalism and Fickle Partitions: Israeli Sovereignty as Operating in 
Relation to the Law 
  
   Juridical markers of Israeli sovereignty are undermined by the actual operations of Israeli 
sovereignty, and yet they remain the signs under which that sovereignty is presented legible. The 
Israeli state’s attempt to assert its sovereignty illegally and to justify those assertions under some 
legal obligation to its own citizens, or at least to some of its citizens, mocks the very determinacy 
of those legal distinctions that are meant to separate Israel from the Palestinian authority.12 The 
material structures built in the name of the sovereignty of Israeli law, and in the name of Israel’s 
sovereign boundaries, effect that sovereignty for the very reason that those effects exceed the 
legal and territorial borders they are meant to mark and defend. What I am describing here is the 
dynamic of exceptionalism. By accusing Israel of “exceptionalism” I mean to highlight the 
capacity of the Israeli state and Israeli subjects to position themselves on the indeterminate space 
between the exception and law so as to remain unaccountable to the norms of either. It is from 
this position that Israel works to normalize multiple spaces of exception to the law while 
retaining the conceit of exceptionality.  
 As scholars Michaeli and Naftali observe, the actions of the Israel state, as an occupying 
state are not so “exceptional” if one takes into account the already existing concept of a “legal 
occupation” within international legal discourse.13 The ambiguities of legal discourse allow the 
Israeli state to articulate its sovereignty both within and without its legal obligations to an 
                                                
12 Amir, Merav. "On the Border of Indeterminacy: The Separation Wall in East Jerusalem." Geopolitics 16, no. 4 
(2011): 768-792. 
13 Ben-Naftali, Orna, Aeyal M. Gross, and Keren Michaeli. "The Illegality of the Occupation Regime: The Fabric of 
Law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory." op. cit (2009): 31-88, 45. 
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international community. This is not to say that international law is not meaningful, or that it 
exists purely and inevitably to maintain the conceit of Israel’s lawfulness. Rather, whatever 
legibility or legitimacy can be accessed through international law is appropriated by the Israeli 
state to present their illegal actions as exceptional, despite and in service of those structures 
which make indeterminate the boundaries and limits of Israeli law.  “Israel,” they observe 
“enjoys in the occupied Palestinian territory both the powers of an occupier and the powers of a 
sovereign, while the Palestinians enjoy neither the rights of an occupied people nor the rights of 
citizenship. This indeterminacy thus, allows Israel to avoid the wrath of the international 
community for having illegally annexed the territory while pursuing the policies of “greater 
Israel” without jeopardizing its Jewish majority”14. Consequently, Palestinians are placed in a 
double bind in relation to the law. If it is in the name of the sovereignty of the law that Israeli 
perpetuates extralegal actions, and if it is in the name of the distinction between the lawful and 
the lawless that Israel disrupts the very distinction between them, what effective recourse should 
Palestinians take in relation to the law? For Israelis, the partitions that signify the distinction 
between inside and outside, and the distinction between law and exception actually mark the 
sites where Israeli citizens are insulated by and simultaneously freed from that very distinction. 
Inversely for Palestinians these sites mark the experience of being made accountable to that 
which already excludes them. When I discuss forms of cultural and political exceptionalism, I 
will also point to this quality of partition. I find that Israeli and Palestinian spaces overlap in 
ways which effect and maintain structural violence against Palestinians. Correlatively, 
Palestinians are condemned for a fragmented political subject hood and sovereignty for which 
the Israeli state is at least partially responsible. Meanwhile Israelis are licensed to transgress the 
boundaries of political subjecthood and sovereignty, often in the name of those boundaries on 
                                                
14 Ibid., 66. 
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which sovereignty is supposedly contingent.  
 Just as Israeli law is applied selectively both within and without what is officially 
recognized as Israeli territory, so too is sovereignty selectively enacted both within and without 
Israeli legal structures. The relationship between the Israeli state and Palestinians in East 
Jerusalem is a good example of this. The separation wall has annexed East Jerusalem. The wall 
snakes around Palestinian communities in an attempt to take as much land and as few 
Palestinians as possible. In the process the borders of Israel’s self-proclaimed capital continue to 
expand into occupied territory. Palestinians living in this annexed territory are excluded from 
Israeli citizenship. Further, because they reside in annexed territory they are also excluded the 
slight protections that would be granted to them by Palestinian citizenship.15 Instead of 
citizenship they are granted the precarious title of “temporary resident.” The Palestinian resident 
of East Jerusalem appears to exhibit an exceptional and temporary relationship to government 
and legal structures. It is this indeterminacy that privileges the livelihood of Israeli settlers, while 
it makes precarious the livelihood of Palestinians. Further, the state attempts to license the 
permanence of structures such as checkpoints or the separation wall, through these forms of 
indeterminate and temporary subjecthood. In the case of East Jerusalem, the Israeli government 
is certainly serious about removing Palestinians from the land. It is the “temporary” presence of 
Palestinians within Israeli occupied territory that serves as a managed threat to Israeli 
sovereignty: this exposes Palestinians to the unlawful actions of the Israeli state. The institutions 
of surveillance and control, built in order to handle this problem of ambiguous citizenship, 
maintain the status of Palestinians as subjects to Israeli sovereignty while excluding Palestinians 
from the citizenship that is extended to Israelis made easily accessible to the entire Jewish 
                                                
15 Tawil-Souri, Helga. "Uneven Borders, Coloured (Im)mobilities: ID Cards in Palestine/Israel." Geopolitics 17, no. 
1 (2012): 158 
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diaspora. This dynamic of exclusive inclusion, as we will see in other forms of exceptionalism, 
operates quite discriminately as a practice of both subjection and subversion in relation to the 
limits of the law and to the limits of citizenship.16 
 Exceptionalism is effective partially because it normalizes a double standard in how the 
law applies to Israelis and Palestinians. This double standard operates in a condition of legal 
indeterminacy characterized by architectural theorist Eyal Weizman as a state of “temporary 
permanence”17. Under this condition the opening up of Palestinians to the force of Israeli law 
overlaps with the insulation awarded to Israelis by the law. This is especially the case regarding 
the settlement infrastructure of the West Bank. In the early stages of the post-1967 settlement 
boom, the annexation of land for settlement and occupation was declared legal so long as 
settlements reflected a temporary incursion into foreign territory in response to a temporary 
security risk.18 It was the very conceit of a temporary occupation, of a “legal” occupation, which 
nourished the permanence of an illegal presence in foreign territory. In 1978, a justice of the 
Israeli high court defended the legality of an accelerating and increasingly permanent 
infrastructure of settlement and occupation on the grounds of its temporariness, stating, “the 
possession itself may one day come to an end as a result of international negotiations which 
could end in a new arrangement that will gain force under international legal in attempt to speak 
generally to the relationship between Israeli articulations of sovereign law”19. In the case of 
settlement and occupation, legality and extralegality become co-constitutive, producing 
indeterminacy between the law and the exception to the law through which sovereignty is 
asserted. Adi Ophir and Ariella Azoulay comment on the logic of temporary permanence, as that 
                                                
16 Azoulay, Ariella, and Adi Ophir. "The monster’s tail." Against the Wall (2005): 2-27.??? 
17 Weizman, Eyal. Hollow land: Israel's architecture of occupation. Verso Books, 2012, 102. 
18 Ibid., 103.  
19 Ibid., 103.  
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which allows sovereign authorities to incorporate the threat or promise of an end to occupation 
as justification for its persistence: “Temporariness is now the law of occupation…occupier, is an 
unrestrained, almost boundless sovereign, because when everything is temporary almost 
anything, any crime, any form of violence is acceptable, because the temporariness seemingly 
grants it a license, the license of the state of emergency”20.  
Israeli occupation is defended as a response to exceptional circumstances, and yet this 
justification serves to maintain indeterminacy between the exception and the law through which 
Israeli sovereignty is asserted. Weizman writes that, “When the settlement activity seemed to 
degenerate into complete chaos it was because this chaos was often promoted from the centre. 
Actual or claimed loss of control in the Occupied territories thus itself became an effective 
government strategy. The appearance of being out of control allowed the state to achieve its 
ideological objectives without accepting responsibility for them.”21 The Israeli state justifies its 
complicity with settler vigilantism on the basis of its legal obligation to its citizens, but because 
these Settlers were presented as in some way outside the domain of the Israeli sovereign, the 
government continues to act as though it is not equally responsible for that vigilantism.22 
Inversely, Palestinians are abandoned by the law at the same time that they are violently 
subjugated to the force of the law. This double abandonment and intrusion operates in the name 
of a distinction between the lawful and the exceptional that the Israeli state has already exceeded. 
This juridical flexibility is maintained through an infrastructure of occupation, through which 
                                                
20 Ophir, Adi, Michal Givoni, and Sārī Ḥanafī, eds. The Power of Inclusive Exclusion: Anatomy of Israeli Rule in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories. New York: Zone Books, 2009, 104. 
21 Weizman, Eyal. Hollow land: Israel's architecture of occupation. Verso Books, 2012, 95. 
22 Shaw-Smith, Peter. "The Israeli Settler Movement Post-Oslo." Journal of Palestine Studies 23.3 (1994): 99-109. 
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sovereignty is asserted in response to an indeterminacy that is partially engendered by those 
structures.23 
         There exists a network of “temporary” structures of governmentality that consists of 
checkpoints, racialized surveillance and identification systems, and physical walling. These 
systems reify rather than untangle a situation of overlapping political geographies.24 Thus, it is 
necessary, as Sari Hanafi and Eyal Weizman have argued, to observe apartheid and partition in 
the OPT as operating 3-dimensionally25. Settlements are often built on hilltops above Palestinian 
communities, and are connected by a series of roadways that bypass the structures of occupation 
below. What may appear to be an indeterminacy on a two dimensional plane is actually a much 
more strategic form of partition. It is one that appropriates and projects a picture of geographical 
indeterminacy in order to effect a much more flexible form of partition. In past peace 
negotiations, the Israel government has conceded that “it is no longer possible to draw a 
continuous line that separates Palestinians from Israelis” and has opted to grant Palestinians 
more sovereignty over the territorial surface in exchange for full sovereignty over the subspace 
and soil.26 Indeed, apartheid already operates along vertical space as settlements are increasingly 
built on hilltops, connected by a complex network of highways inaccessible to Palestinians. 
These highways cruelly mock the network of checkpoints they bypass. This network of 
checkpoints violently fragments Palestinian communities for the sake of Israeli safety.27 
Consequently, Israelis living in the occupied territories live insulated from Palestinian 
communities, while they are continually able to cite the “presence” of Palestinians as that which 
                                                
23 Azoulay, Ariella, and Adi Ophir. "The monster’s tail." Against the Wall (2005): 2-27. 
24 Parsons, Nigel, and Mark B. Salter. "Israeli biopolitics: Closure, territorialisation and governmentality in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories." Geopolitics 13, no. 4 (2008): 701-723. 
25 Hanafi, Sari. "Spacio-cide and Bio-politics: The Israeli colonial conflict from 1947 to the Wall." Against the Wall, 
The New Press, New York (2005), 162. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Zureik, Elia, David Lyon, and Yasmeen Abu-Laban, eds. Surveillance and control in Israel/Palestine: population, 
territory and power. Vol. 33. Routledge, 2010, 27.  
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necessitates the greater construction of biopolitical systems of surveillance and control, systems 
that already exclude Israeli settlers.  
 The fact that both Israelis and Palestinians are often placed in a liminal space between the 
exception and law makes it difficult to discern whether an effective critique of, or resistance to, 
contemporary forms of Israeli sovereignty should come from within or without the law. I believe 
that Giorgio Agamben’s sovereign describes the kind of exceptionalism I have observed in the 
operation of Israeli sovereignty. These qualities call into question the notion of sovereignty as 
operating fully and naturally according to certain preconceived metaphysical presuppositions, 
despite the fact that Agamben tries to explain exceptionalism as intrinsic to sovereignty. Still, he 
maintains the capacity of the sovereign to transgress certain existential boundaries. This is 
problematic insofar as it endows the sovereign with tactics that are not in contest, and thus 
cannot be appropriated for the sake of counter tactics. Consequently, I wish to expose the limits 
of Agamben’s metaphysical account of sovereignty and the exception, which, because 
sovereignty is treated as a thing, rather than a practice, seems immune to effective critique.   
 For Giorgio Agamben, exceptionalism, or, the operation of sovereignty in the 
indistinction between the exception and the law, is the fundamental mode of sovereignty’s 
operations. Agamben, like Schmitt,28 believes that in order for sovereignty to operate above the 
law, there consequently must be an intimacy between the law and that which exceeds the law.29 
This is the paradox of sovereignty that explains the impossibility of both separating and 
collapsing the distinction between the law and the exception. Following this, Agamben places as 
distinct and prior to the law the liminal space between it and the exception. He writes, “the state 
of exception is thus not the chaos that precedes the order but rather the situation that results from 
                                                
28 Schmitt, Carl. Political theology: Four chapters on the concept of sovereignty. University of Chicago Press, 1985. 
29 Agamben, Giorgio. Homo sacer: Sovereign power and bare life. Stanford University Press, 1998, 25.  
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its suspension.”30 Agamben paints a picture of distorted space and time, where the sovereign 
operates outside of its own existential terms. In this condition, sovereignty operates both outside 
itself and in a sense prior to or generally out of step with itself. He argues that the law cannot be 
reduced to the exception, although the exception remains always present within the law for the 
sake of the law’s ability to operate. The law continues to assert itself as a presence, even as it 
necessarily asserts itself outside of itself. But where is it possible to locate, and thus critique or 
challenge sovereignty in this picture? By what markers is it possible to identify the sovereign in 
this condition? Agamben’s theory of sovereignty remains decisionistic although it is not always 
clear who/what is making the decision. He writes, “The sovereign, who is outside the law, 
declares that there is nothing outside the law.”31 The implication is that sovereignty operates by 
taking its own existence, or rather the question of its existence as an object of its operations. The 
fact that it is difficult to locate sovereignty in this picture perhaps speaks to the capacity of states, 
such as the Israeli state, to articulate sovereignty selectively both within and without the law.  
 The sovereign assertion requires the self-sacrifice of the law. This self-immolation is 
necessarily enacted in order to bring about the exception. Agamben writes, “The exception does 
not subtract itself from the rule; rather, the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and 
maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first constitutes itself as a rule…The sovereign 
decision of the exception is the originary juridico-political structure on the basis of which what is 
included in the juridical order and what is excluded from it acquire their meaning.”32 Assuming 
that sovereignty continues to be made legible through the law, Agamben completely disrupts the 
chronology of sovereignty’s coming into being by asserting that sovereignty of the law is 
actualized through its self-immolation. How then, is it possible for the law to enact anything, if 
                                                
30 Ibid., 18 
31 Ibid., 15.  
32 Ibid., 16 
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this enaction exists prior to its constitution as a law? Who/what enacts this, and by what 
standards can this enaction be recognized as a withdrawl? Does this withdrawl not already 
require some distinction between the exception and the law? Would not the operation of 
sovereignty erode this distinction?  
 Agamben describes a sovereign whose actions appear to be self-destructive but in fact 
constitute the natural being of the sovereign. Yet, given Agamben’s own description, and my 
own observation of contemporary Israeli sovereignty, it would appear that for sovereignty to 
remain effective and persistent in this manner, there must be some disjunction between what 
sovereignty is and what sovereignty does, precisely for the very reason that sovereignty 
necessarily asserts itself by exceeding its own boundaries. Agamben would perhaps argue that 
regardless of whether one privileges the exception or the law in the constitution of political 
sovereignty, one cannot avoid the fact that each necessarily maintains the trace of the other that 
exists exterior to it.33I find it odd, then, that Agamben’s account of sovereignty is metaphysical 
given the fact that sovereignty of the law is constituted by a transgression of its own existential 
limits. Thus Agamben implies that sovereignty is not just a thing, but rather is mobilized through 
a state of coming into, or being brought into being.34 
 I do not agree with Agamben that exceptionalism is intrinsic to sovereignty. However, 
Agamben accurately describes how sovereignty is presented by the Israeli state. This is a 
presentation that many take as a given. Through a series of overlapping geographies, the Israeli 
state effects its sovereignty by declaring outside the law and beyond its own constructed 
boundaries that there is no sovereignty outside the law. Yet in doing so, Israel normalizes the 
very states of exception that serve as the stage on which sovereignty continues to be mobilized.  
                                                
33 Ibid., 19.  
34 Ibid., 16 
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 If sovereignty operates by normalizing the exception, how is it possible for Israel to 
maintain the conceit of its exceptionality and to do so in a way that further insulates that 
exceptionalism from its own self-destructiveness? Agamben implies that this is possible when he 
describes the sovereign as being able to strategically operate in disjunction from itself, without 
actually bringing into contestation the terms of its own legibility as sovereign. Wendy Brown 
argues that, “exceptionality cannot become permanent without eroding the norm defining it and 
against which it functions, without replacing that norm itself and thereby forfeiting the status of 
exceptionality through which sovereignty is defined.”35 The threats to states and subjects are 
interiorized in order condition the sovereignty of states and subjects. But, if this is the case, then 
in what sense are they threats any longer, and by what means is it possible to maintain the 
conceit of them as such? If the sovereignty of states and subjects operates by normalizing their 
own exceptionality, how is it possible for these entities to maintain the conceit of their 
exceptionality?  
 Brown, like Agamben, attempts to make sense of the contradiction between the 
“evanescent, protean, and depthless traits of late modern culture and politics,” and the stark 
repressive power reflected by contemporary practices of walling.”36 Brown argues that these 
repressive devices are constructed to enact a condition of sovereignty that is precluded by the 
condition actually effected by those walls.37 Sovereignty is in this sense disclosed by the failure 
of sovereign states to maintain sovereignty according to the fantasy of Schmittian politics. But 
again, as I argued in my discussion of Israeli exceptionalism, these, albeit performative, 
structures do not fail to normalize occupation and apartheid. The wall engenders the very 
lawlessness it is built to combat. Instead of creating civil relations between those it is meant to 
                                                
35 Brown, Wendy. Walled states, waning sovereignty. New York: Zone Books, 2010, 86.  
36 Ibid, 84.  
37 Ibid, 90.  
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separate, “the staging of sovereign integrity, order, and force in the face of sovereign decline 
both draws upon and intensifies a xenophobic sense of nationhood among the nation’s 
subjects.”38 Regardless, this wall is not even contiguous with the borders of national identity and 
some of the most some of the most forceful declarations of Israeli sovereignty are made by 
Israeli settlers outside of Israeli territory.39 If this is the case than there must be a mechanism that 
insulates sovereignty from the lawlessness it fosters, and from its own complicity with that 
lawlessness. This mechanism could be explained by a number of structural factors, including but 
not limited to, the growing power lent to the Israeli state by its role in the production of global 
capital, or discursive authority lent to articulations of Israeli sovereignty.  
 For Agamben, the placing of states and subjects on liminal space of outlawry reflects the 
original political relation through which sovereignty is constituted.40 Further, the indeterminacy 
of those markers that have historically served as signifiers of political sovereignty, (such as 
territorial and legal borders), constitute the original and fundamental condition of sovereignty 
and politics. Again, it is odd that Agamben places a premium on an original and fundamental 
relation of political sovereignty when, for Agamben, sovereignty appears effective for the very 
reason that sovereignty actualizes itself by disproving an obligation to the previous terms of its 
own existence.41 I find these conclusions radical insofar as they challenge the notion of political 
sovereignty as contingent on the clear distinction of legal and territorial boundaries, yet I believe 
that they wash over the ways in which different subjects’ relationship to those boundaries are 
contingent on certain political nuances (geopolitical struggle, racism and ethnic conflict, to name 
a few).  
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 Agamben describes this position within and without the law (as norm) as a general 
category for all subjects. Yet, Agamben makes a clear distinction between two paradigmatic 
figures of politics, the sovereign and the sacred man. This difference, like the difference between 
sovereignty’s presence and absence, or the difference between its self-assertion and self-
destruction has problematic political implications. For Agamben, both live in a state of exclusive 
inclusion in relation the law, yet while the sovereign is privileged by the law that he transcends, 
the sacred man is stripped of all political subjectivity and reduced to bare life by the law that 
abandons him. The sacred man is included as an object of political authority, since he can be 
killed without threat of punishment, but is excluded from having any agency within politics. He 
cannot be sacrificed because he is already included as a sacred object of political sovereignty, 
and thus his life and death are not political agency, even though they appear central to politics.42 
Both the sovereign and the sacred man are bound together, like two sides of the same coin, 
despite the political disparity that exists between them.43 Finally, the relationship between the 
two is not contingent historically and politically specific structural factors, but rather exists 
before and thus cannot be reduced to those markers of cultural or political difference by which 
we might come to recognize the relationship between sovereigns and subjects. Given this, I agree 
with Catharine Mills when she writes that Agamben’s writing “relegates characteristics such as 
race and gender to the level of the ontic, thus setting them outside the ontological focus that 
Agamben’s theorization valorizes. Secondly, in doing so, it risks abstracting too far from any 
recognition of the unequal distribution of the burdens of vulnerability and violence across social, 
economic and (geo)political spheres”44.  Certainly the greater privilege and freedom of Israelis in 
contrast to Palestinians livelihood is not intrinsic to an abstracted relationship between them. 
                                                
42 Ibid, 82.  
43 Ibid, 84.  
44 Mills, Catherine. The philosophy of Agamben. Stocksfield: Acumen, 2008, 136. 
     
 
21 
This difference is dependent on the normalization of structural violence. In Israel/Palestine, 
privilege and oppression operate through systems of governmentality built by the Israeli state, 
which sort and classify individuals on the basis of race and ethnicity. Secondly, Agamben writes 
that the production of bare life and the exclusion of peoples from the political sphere is the 
fundamental political act of sovereignty. Yet, he also asserts that the sacred man has no access to 
political efficacy or agency.45 So the sacred man is politically meaningful and valuable to the 
sovereign but is only politically valuable as a passive object of that which excludes them. I think 
this is a double standard, and I think it is problematic that Agamben attempts to reduce this 
double standard to metaphysical presuppositions.  
 This is an issue that I will discuss at greater length when my analysis of sovereignty and 
exceptionalism moves to take into account how sovereignty is articulated and operates 
discursively according to cultural and political norms. Given the deep asymmetry that separates 
and the strong duality that binds the sovereign to the sacred man, I am generally interested in 
how the assertions of sovereignty made by some states and subjects become recognized and 
taken for granted, despite the fact that such assertions appear to exceed the norms through which 
states and subjects are presented, and thus should threaten their intelligibility. I wish to 
understand better the persistence of contemporary sovereignty, but also the repeated failure of 
certain claims for self-determination and collective sovereignty. What, then are the stakes of 
articulating and asserting sovereignty, and how are these risks distributed? If it is through the 
withdrawl of the law from itself that sovereignty is in some way asserted and effected, than how 
can this withdrawl simultaneously privilege and insulate Israeli’s while abandoning and 
condemning Palestinians?  
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 Take for example, once again, the case of Israeli settlement. As Eyal Weizman argues, 
the vigilante justice excercised by settlers is important to the capacity of the state to maintain 
supremacy at its borders. Brown argues that the blurring of the space between the exception and 
the law is strategic, for the very reason that it allows states to defer on to sovereignty to those 
whose actions they are not accountable to, despite the fact that this challenges the state’s 
“monopoly on decisionism as well as the monopoly on violence presumed to anchor state 
sovereignty”46. Individuals attempting either to take the law in their own hand, or to simply 
break the law in the name of their status as citizens of a sovereignty state enact a sovereignty but 
in doing so challenge the legal norms and territorial boundedness to which that sovereignty is 
supposedly obligated.47 If a vigilante is someone who takes the law into their own hands, then it 
is already implied that the vigilante is some way free to do so and therefore outside of the law. 
The Israeli state and Israeli settlers are able to more comfortably assert their sovereignty as 
outlaws, but remain insulated by the terms of the law. They attempt make outlawry legible as a 
legal norm, and this exceptionalism succeeds because of existing political and economic 
structures that are exclusive and discriminatory in nature.48 If there is a risk to asserting 
sovereignty in this way, then it is not a factor for those entities whose  right to sovereignty is 
already taken as a given.49 
 Agamben’s theory seems to undercut the efficacy of a critique of contemporary 
sovereignty. However, he supplies us with some of the tools through which a critique of 
exceptionanlism could be constructed. This critique would be based on the practices 
demonstrated by the Agambenian sovereign, if we understand those practices to be political 
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achievements and not natural qualities intrinsic to sovereignty. The sovereign’s capacity to 
operate between exception and norm, and to assert its exceptionality in the name of those laws 
denigrated by the exception, may be a fact of contemporary politics, but it is not necessarily the 
telos of politics. Further, the legibility of this assertion of exceptionality cannot be taken for 
granted, especially if one takes into account the failure of Palestinians to effectively challenge 
the Israeli exceptionalism, through claims to Palestinian sovereignty. By attempting to 
rationalize this fact, or what Agamben calls “the paradox of sovereignty,” one opens up the 
possibility of critically redeploying that paradox in ways that are effectively empowering. With 
this in mind I would like to return to my description of exceptionalism, focusing now on how 


















Cultural Exceptionalism and Zionist Narratives: Articulations of Israeli Sovereignty As 
Operating in Relation to Cultural Norms 
         Cultural exceptoinalism describes the phenomenon by which certain cultural norms are 
exceeded in the assertion of those norms. Consequently, to say that a certain identity is 
exceptional is to, as Puar argues, imply that those individuals paradigmatically conform to and 
maintain a mastery over cultural norms.50 Thus, cultural binaries that tend to discriminate 
between Israelis and Palestinians are effective in asserting the supremacy of certain identities 
partially because they exceed the norms of identification. Like those material and legal partitions 
that mobilize Israeli sovereignty,  the Arab/Jew binary is not effective at discriminating against 
Palestinians because it forestalls all movement across it. Rather, it and they are effective because 
they normalize the capacity for Israelis to transgress those norms while remaining insulated by 
them. I draw a parallel between articulations of Israeli identity of the sovereignty of Israeli law, 
as Israeli sovereignty is increasingly tied to issues of cultural and ethnic belonging. The 
articulation of Israel as a state of and for the Jews implies that the sovereignty of Israel is 
contingent on the purity and determinacy of the state’s “Jewish character.”51 However, I argue 
that in the attempt to assemble a determinate Jewish “people” from which the Israeli state would 
receive its authority, that this notion of a “Jewish people” already exceeds the mobilization of 
Israeli sovereignty. In this sense the indeterminacy of the Jewish/Arab binary may appear as a 
threat to Israeli sovereignty, and it is often presented as such. However these cultural norms are 
effective insofar as they already include the exception to those norms. This is demonstrated by 
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the appropriation of some Arab identities as “Jewish” and the exclusion of other Arab identities 
as “Palestinian.” These latter identities are treated as a threat to the state’s “Jewish” character.   
         There is perhaps no greater irony to the citation of porous borders as justification for 
Israel’s lawlessness, than Israel’s openness to the world’s Jewish population. Despite the fact I 
am not technically Jewish according to Orthodox Law, I would have much less difficulty 
obtaining Israeli citizenship than a Palestinian Arab born and raised in the capital of Israel. The 
relationship of Diaspora to the Zionist rhetoric of the state reflects, as Helga Tawil-Souri 
observes, a contradictory logic of “not having stated borders but wanting to defend them.” She 
writes that, “Israel is a ‘de-bordered’ state insofar as it is the nation for the world’s Jews, not 
simply for Israelis who may or may not be Jewish, such as the 20% of the population within 
‘Israel proper’”52. Israel’s borders are consistently penetrated, as dictated by the Zionist state’s 
claim to sovereignty. This claim at once enacts Israeli sovereignty as a solution to and negation 
of the Jewish Diaspora. The Zionist state’s claim to popular sovereignty operates as an 
unconditional claim in the name of the Jewish people, despite the fact that it is not a state 
representative of the entire Jewish population. This claim is a productive one insofar as the 
Jewish identity of the Israeli state is asserted as an exceptional claim, necessitated by the fact that 
the Jewish population exceeds the Israeli state’s claim as the state of the Jews. It is not simply a 
description of what already exists but rather a claim which owes its force and momentum to the 
exceptional situation facing a the Jewish people, a situation that if the Israeli state were to 
actually solve would threaten the unconditionality of its claims to sovereignty.  As a result, the 
Israeli state continues to articulate its sovereignty as that which is yet to be realized, not because 
it cannot be realized, but because it is threatened by the presence of the Palestinian “other.” What 
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this reveals is not simply precarity of the “Jewishness” of the Jewish state, but that such precarity 
is employed maintain the unconditionality of the Israeli right to sovereignty. The claim that 
Jewish people require a state is bolstered by the condition of being a people without a home (a 
condition shared by many Palestinians), which is potentially problematic insofar as a diasporic 
condition is antithetical to statehood. Again, we see that the dissolution of sovereignty as 
presented by the Israeli state helps to mobilize a sovereignty that does not really operate 
according to the cultural norms that it cited as its foundation for existence. This is perhaps why 
Agamben attempts to link the dissolution of sovereignty to its persistence and rearticulation, as 
the condition of sovereignty’s self presentation according to certain norms is both undermined 
and animated by that assertion.  
        The ambiguous and volatile relationship between Zionism and diaspora reflect a 
perversely constitutive relationship between what affirms and threatens Jewishness. It is in the 
name of its very negation, that the exceptionality of the diasporic condition is asserted.53 
Consequently the Diaspora is an efficacious and malleable political instrument, and as an 
inviolable icon of the Jewish experience. Palestinian critics, such as Joseph Massad, have 
attempted to challenges the monopoly that Zionists narrative have on the diasporic experience, 
by bringing to light Zionism’s own fraught relationship to that history. Such attempts are 
upsetting to the image of Israel as a “western outpost on a eastern front.” This image is 
politically strategic because it is paradoxical, and because it allows the Israeli states and subjects 
to articulate the sovereignty of identity as that which both exceeds and paradigmatically 
conforms to the limits, parameters and obligations of national belonging54. To be like a Western 
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nation state Zionism must eventually give up the exceptionality lent to the Israeli state by the 
Jewish diaspora. Yet it is the diasporic history of the Jews that makes their claim to statehood 
legible and legitimate, at the “unfortunate” cost of the Palestinian Diaspora. Zionism, in its 
operations, both excludes the diaspora as an obstacle to the realization of Israeli identity, and 
includes the diaspora as a venerable token of Israeli exceptionalism. 
         While articulations of Israeli national and cultural belonging exclude the Arab other as 
that, which poses an existential threat to Jewish/Israeli identity, the Arab-Palestinian remains 
integral to the operation of the Zionist master narrative. It is the threat and obstacle of the 
Palestinian “other” that is cited to prove both the exceptional vulnerability and perseverance of 
the Jewish way of life.55 On the other hand, “they” are objectified and fetishized as keys to 
accessing Jewish origins. Within narratives of Zionism, “arabness,” both in the figure of the 
Palestinian and in the figure of the Arab Jew, is an object of desire. Arab Jewish scholar and 
activist Ella Shohat writes that, “The Arab was perceived as the incarnation of ‘the ancient, pre-
exiled Jews’, ‘the Semitic not yet corrupted by wanderings in exile’, and therefore, to a certain 
extent, an authentic Jew. The projection of the Arab as preserving archaic ways, and rootedness 
in the land of the Bible, in contrast with the landless ghetto Jew, provoked a qualified 
identification with the Arab as the desired object of imitation for Zionist youth in 
Palestine/Israel, and as reunification with the remnant of the free and proud ancient Hebrew”56. 
Arab identity becomes in appropriated in the assertion of Israeli’s as culturally hybrid and 
multicultural. Later I will discuss how this presentation of cultural hybridity is key to the 
articulation of Israeli’s as more progressive than Palestinians.  
  It is this obsession with historical origins as an object to be discovered and selectively 
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celebrated that informs Zionism’s denial of the presence of Palestinians as an agentic subject of 
history. This is after all the already contradictory logic of the Zionist project, to colonize and 
conquer its origins, and to construct a “new” Jewish subject in the name of a condition that it 
wishes to negate. This inclusion as object and exclusion as subject is integral to the operation of 
Orientalist discourse in general. As Edward Said writes, quoting the scholar Anwar Abdel Malek 
“This ‘object’ of study will be, as is customary, passive, non-participating, endowed with a 
historical’ subjectivity, above all, nonactive, -nonautonomous, non-sovereign with regard to 
itself: the only Orient or Oriental or ‘subject’ which could be admitted, at the extreme limit, is 
the alienated being, philosophically, that is, other than itself in relationship to itself, posed, 
understood, defined-and acted- by others”57. If any Palestinian figure is written into narratives of 
Zionism, it is the “terrorist,” who carries an “unwarranted” and murderous desire to annihilate 
the Jewish state. As I will discuss later in my analysis of political norms, this image of 
Palestinian resistance also bolsters the claim that Israel serves as a bastion of secular 
progressiveness in the Middle East (despite its ethnocentric policies). This Islamophobic 
stereotype only further animates the Orientalist discourse that reduces the Palestinian subject to 
“objective” investigations of Islamic or “Arab” history and culture, while effacing the violent 
marks that the history of Zionism has left on the Palestinian subject. 
         The Palestinian and the Arab Jew are both internal others of Zionist discourse. The dual 
restriction and appropriation of othered subjects into the Zionist narrative in ways mirrors 
deployment of European diasporic Jewishness in those narratives. Through both, Zionism 
negatively articulates its own sovereign coherence, capturing what it excludes in the act of 
negation. Both Joseph Massad and Ella Shohat are interested in the complex combination of 
investment in and exclusion of the Arab Jew in Zionist discourse. In the Persistence of the 
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Palestinian Question, Massad writes about movements of resistance among Mizrachi Jews, and 
is especially interested in their identification with the American Black Panther Party.58 Even 
within the confines of legible Jewishness, articulations of the democratic sovereignty of a Jewish 
nation are made hollow by the exclusion of its own recognized people.59 The structural racism 
experienced by Arab Jews exhibits the dark shadow of Zionism’s celebration of the Jew as a 
multicultural and diasporic subject. I would argue that Palestinians living within Israel are not 
second-class, but rather third class citizens. The racism experienced by Arab Jews challenges the 
idea that it is possible to unproblematically appropriate cultural hybridity as a slogan of Israeli 
superiority. I would like to make clear however, that although it is possible to draw similarities 
between the role of Palestinians and Arab Jews in the Zionist master narrative because of their 
“arabness,” their access to legibility and legitimacy within a discourse of national and collective 
sovereignty remains strikingly different. 
         Arab Jews are not subject to the same kind of exclusive inclusion as Palestinians in 
relation to Israeli identity. For Palestinians, their diasporic history is something that is 
consistently denied by the Zionist narrative, perhaps for the reason that the Israeli state claims a 
monopoly on diaspora. I find Joseph Massad’s critique of cultural exceptionalism exciting 
insofar as his critique attempts to challenge exceptionalism by implicating  Zionism in its 
capacity to selectively valorize and condemn practices of identity, and in particular the diasporic 
experience. He writes that “the project of Zionism proved to be two fold, in transforming the Jew 
into the anti-Semite or “anti-Jew” as Israeli clinical psychologist Beit-Hallahmi posited), it 
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became necessary to transform the Palestinian Arab into the disappearing European Jew”60. This 
statement is indeed controversial (and a bit reductive). Yet, it serves as a tactical response to 
many Zionist narratives that depict Palestinians as both desiring diaspora and yet desiring to 
retake the Jewish state. I am reminded of the once popular retelling of the 1948 war, in which 
Palestinians were described as abandoning their own homes, so as to prepare an invasion force 
with which to “drive the Jews into the sea.” This story bolsters the depiction of Israelis as both 
vulnerable and inviolable. It negates the causal link between Israeli statehood and Palestinian 
diaspora at the same time that it wishes to use the threat of Palestinian resistance as justification 
for the aggressive outlawry and exceptionalism of the Israeli state. Consequently, Zionist rhetoric 
refuses to recognize the Palestinian diaspora, as its legibility as such would be seen as an affront 
to the authority of Jewish history. And yet, despite this, Zionist rhetoric also licenses state 
practices that further normalize the diasporic condition of Palestinians in an attempt to negate the 
diasporic condition of the Jewish people.61 
 Understanding that the Israeli sovereign is increasingly identified in reference to a 
cultural totality, I would argue that the actual assertion of sovereignty is animated by cultural 
norms that are exceeded by this assertion. And as Israeli sovereignty increasingly attempts to 
assert its exceptional acts, or conditions as norms in and of themselves, the line between 
distinction between norm and exception becomes increasingly troubled. This is similar to what 
the Agambenian sovereign has demonstrated. By attempting to operate strategically within and 
without its own limits the law appears to undermine itself and in a sense destroy itself, in its very 
assertion. This is what Massad is referring to when argues that Zionism is fraught with a 
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resentment of diasporic Jewish identity. However, it is a fact of contemporary politics that, while 
cultural exceptionalism strategically mobilizes Israeli sovereignty under the conceit of 
vulnerability, for Palestinians, this same dynamic constitutes a double bind. It is difficult for 
Palestinians to assert the exceptionality of their own experience when many still consider it anti-
Semitic for Palestinians to openly identify with history of the Jewish diaspora, or to at least draw 
a parallel between the Jewish and Palestinian diaspora, even though they are expected to 
recognize that history as paradigmatic it in order to make their own suffering legible. In 
conforming to discursive norms of political intelligibility, Palestinians attempting to make their 
claims to national sovereignty legitimate must undercut the potency of that very claim by 
recognizing Jewish exceptionality.62 “The state of racist exception,” writes Nadia Abu-El Haj, 
permeates this structure of command: as scholars, as critics, even as Palestinians who have paid a 
dear price for Israel’s existence, we must reassure you, one of the most militarily powerful states 
on earth, of your right to exist”63. We are faced with a series of questions similar to those ones 
implicated in the operation of legal exceptionalism. How is it possible that for some, the attempt 
to exceed the recognized norms of belonging proves their exceptionality and thus the sovereignty 
of those norms, while for others such a fact constitutes a failure to conform to certain norms from 
which they are already excluded?  
         More recent articulations of Israeli sovereignty have grafted contemporary civilizational 
discourses on to the Zionist narrative and consequently have colonized the language of 
democracy, popular sovereignty, and political pluralism so as to operate as a modality of 
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exclusion. Consider one academic’s assertion that in the post 9/11 era “we are all Israelis”64In 
this sentence exceptionality and normativity overlap. The “we” being referred to in this statement 
is inclusive insofar as it sets the limits of Israeli identity beyond the most secular notions of 
Jewishness. Yet it is that very act of inclusion that proves and affirms a much more pervasive 
form of exclusion. This “we” could perhaps be extended to “we democrats,” or “we people 
progressive nations,” or “we people of western nations,” despite the fact that Israel is neither 
democratic, progressive, nor in the West. The operation of the principles of democratic and 
popular sovereignty as signifiers of national, cultural or even racial belonging, brings into relief 
one of the more insidious development of Israeli exceptionalism, its robbing of Palestinians of 
the political language to which they are expected to conform. The image of Israel as both Jewish 
and Democratic, or as the only democracy in the Middle East exemplifies this double standard. 
 I am interested in theories of identity and sovereignty that conceptualize both as that 
which is neither revealed as an already naturally existing (or not existing) totality, nor 
orchestrated and reorchestrated in every moment. Rather I wish to conceptualize sovereignty and 
identity as that which is mobilized through action, and assertion. Consequently I would like to 
understand those norms under sovereignty as being enacted. The effectiveness of this 
mobilization of one’s identity through enaction and the determination of one’s supposedly self-
determined self sets the stage for future assertions. This effectiveness is not predetermined by the 
objective existence of that which the claim refers to. However neither is it completely contingent 
on the will of the individual, as claims of identity are deeply structured by existing norms of 
recognition. There are high political and material stakes to the assertion of sovereignty and 
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identity65. In the case of Israel assertions of sovereignty are tied to the assertions of particular 
identities, and both require recognition. Judith Butler writes that “to be addressed is not merely 
to be recognized for what one already is, but to have the very term conferred by which the 
recognition of existence becomes possible…One ‘exists’ not by virtue of being recognized, but, 
in a prior sense, by being recognizable”66. Consequently, there are two risks involved when an 
individual or totality asserts itself. These are risks that cannot necessarily be taken into account 
or calculated in advance by a unitary subject, yet these risks shape the development of different 
tactics through which political subjectivity is constituted, challenged, or reinforced.67  
 Primarily there is a risk that the assertion of sovereignty or identity will not be recognized 
or deemed legible. Perhaps this is because it is revealed to be an enaction, as not complying with 
the norms of what is being asserted, as I have attempted to argue that the force of the enaction 
necessarily exceeds those norms in order to effective. It is also often if not always the case that 
questions of legibility and recognition are not immanent to those attempting to receive 
recognition. I would argue that the latter is often the case with Palestinian claims for collective 
sovereignty, where visibility and legibility is constant struggle against the power of Zionist 
rhetoric. Secondly, as Judith Butler observes in “Imitation and Gender Insubordination,” in the 
act of having one’s performance recognized one risks being, “re-colonized under which [they] 
write”68. Regardless of how these risks are distributed, we can say that identity is neither an 
objective thing nor a subjective choice. Rather, it is practice that transforms the subject in the 
process of identification, but does not necessarily subsume that subject. 
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 I argue that Israeli sovereignty operates through unequal distribution these risks between 
Israelis and Palestinians. In Israel/Palestine the risks of having one’s claims validated are much 
less for Israeli articulations of sovereignty and identity. Thus, Palestinians are much more reliant 
on the determinacy of a personal and collective sovereignty, and consequently the personal and 
collective identities through which sovereignty is increasingly articulated. The recognition of 
Israel’s identity as a sovereign democratic and pluralistic state is in no way threatened by its 
ethnocentric policies. Nor do the progressive platitudes of the Israeli state appear to harm the 
privilege experienced by white Jews in Israel. Rather, the Israeli state attempts to normalize its 
own exceptional practices while it continues to argue that its claims to sovereignty are 
unconditional, due to the extreme situation facing the Jewish people. It is in these cases that 
identity as a practice, and not as a natural constant, is a cause for celebration. For Israelis, these 
practices prove the unreifiability and exceptionality of the identity disclosed, while they 
simultaneously affirm the efficacy of identification as exceptional. In this context practices that  
challenge the presence of an “empirically determined subject”69 becomes celebrated as an ethos 
of outlawry that is perpetuated by the Israeli state. Parallel to the fact that vigilantism has is a 
strategic mode by which to effect sovereignty both within and without the law, the presentation 
of Jewish Israeli identity as multicultural and thus transgressive in its relation to cultural binaries 
insulates Zionist claims to the exceptionality and inviolability of Jewish identity from the effects 
of those claims. 
 In the case of Palestinian claims, the disjunction between the norms through which 
sovereignty and identity is asserted, and the actual force of that assertion, underscores the 
inability to have one’s own claims recognized according to existing norms. I will discuss this 
more in depth when I tackle the question of political norms and their growing intimacy with 
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cultural binaries. I will say that tactically, this dilemma reflects a double bind. The demands of 
recognition are structured in such a way that one remains jammed between the desire to 
effectively assert ones sovereignty according to certain cultural and political norms and the 
desire to have those norms recognized.  Consequently, Zionist articulations of Israeli Jewish 
identity are able to strategically play with the Jewish/Arab binaries, while Palestinians are 
condemned both for attempting to include themselves within narratives of the Jewish experience 
and are chastised for being unable to accept a more pluralistic practices of identification. Given 
this double bind, some theorists have advocated for practices of identity that look to sites of 
cultural hybridity in order to reappropriate the tactics of exceptionalism. These theorists, having 
already having recognized that cultural binaries are being transgressed and played with for the 
sake of maintaining Israeli privilege, attempt to reclaim hybridity for the sake of progressive 
politics.   
 To say that identity is often implicated in certain practices of hybridity is to imply that 
there is a paradoxical intimacy and disjunction between identity, and the capacity of identity to 
be asserted effectively. In other words, identity and sovereignty both constitute and challenge the 
integrity of the other. Consequently, identity always appears tainted by that either exceeds or 
fails to conform to its own terms. If, in order to maintain the sovereignty of identity, the 
individual or collective subject described must exceed the terms of description, then this identity 
necessarily implicates that which is excluded from the terms of description. In Parting Ways: 
Jewishness and the Critique of Zionism, Butler argues both that hybrid identities are already 
implicated within the Zionist project and that it may be possible to embrace hybridity as a way to 
affirm or celebrate Jewishness without continuing to privilege Jewish identity. In this sense, 
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Butler’s work is aligned with some of the later work of Edward Said70. For Butler, the 
understanding of Jewishness as suffering from a necessary impurity or mixing with otherness, 
opens up new directions in identitarian politics71. Butler’s project resonates with Said’s 
occasional identification as a “Jewish Palestinian,” which underscored his attempt to lay the 
foundations for a bi-national project of popular sovereignty as well as to make legible the 
discursively invisibilized markings of Jewish identity on the Palestinian subject. Butler is just as 
interested in uncovering the “arabness” within her Jewish identity, as Said is in uncovering the 
“jewishness” in his Arab identity.  Butler is particularly excited with Said’s work Freud and the 
Non-European, which celebrates Moses as both a foundational and excluded figure for the very 
reason that he was an “Arab Jew.” For Said, the foundational figure challenges the identitarian 
boundaries that are constructed in the name of that very foundation.72  
 Indeed Said’s assertion as a Jewish Palestinian is highly enactive. In fact, it appears at 
first glance so performative that it is unlikely to receive recognition as anything other than 
disrespectful to those who feel an intimacy with a collective Jewish identity. However, I believe 
Butler’s own attempt to reclaim alterity within Jewish thought is more likely to be read as 
progressive (or at least less likely to be read as anti-Semitic) because she has the privilege of 
challenging Zionist conceptions of Jewish supremacy through Jewish resources.  Butler is 
concerned with this fact. She observes that “by claiming there is a significant Jewish tradition 
affirming modes of justice and equality that would, of necessity, lead to a criticism of the Israeli 
state, I establish a Jewish perspective that is non-Zionist, even anti-Zionist, at the risk of making 
even the resistance to Zionism into a “Jewish” value and so asserting, indirectly, the exceptional 
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ethical resources of Jewishness”73. Edward Said has a different problem. His attempt to 
appropriate alterity for the sake of recognizability as both a victim and a subject of Zionist 
hegemony, not only triggers backlash for appearing anti-Semitic, but also contradicts the dual 
claim that Palestinians constitute a “real” and homogenous people, and that they are deserving of 
political self-determination. Particularly instructive is Joseph Massad’s critique of Said in this 
case. He argues that Said’s attempt to challenge cultural exceptionalism by appropriating the 
alterity already play in the operation of cultural supremacy may put too much faith in the ability 
for creative self-expression to realize a post-nationalist form of citizenship, or a post-racial form 
of identity. Massad points out that such connections between Jewish and Palestinian suffering 
can be made, but can only be made “rhetorically.”74 This may seem odd given Massad’s even 
more controversial attempts to challenge Jewish exceptionalism by making those rhetorical 
connections. I would argue, however, that Massad’s attempt is more openly aware of the limits 
placed on such statements as a result of their rhetorical nature and reductive tendency, and for 
that reason is much more the effective than Said’s attempt to, as Hochberg explains “go across 
but do not enforce the lines of separation”75. Massad takes into account what Shohat refers to as 
the “Israeli monopoly over representations of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.”76 I am inclined to 
support this critique given that Zionist narratives have already deployed those identifications that 
transgress the Arab/Israeli binary in order to assert the progressiveness of Israeli’s in contrast to 
Palestinians. It would be much more accurate to say that these practices of cultural hybridity in 
fact underline an objectification and fetishization of Arab Culture and Arab subjects within 
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Zionist narratives, despite the lack of recognition received by Arab Palestinians in those 
narratives.  
 What I am attempting to call attention to the site of disjunction between the fact of 
identity or the fact of sovereignty, and the force implicated in the assertion of identity and 
sovereignty. This is perhaps most clear in the case of rights claiming, especially when those 
rights are claimed on behalf of a certain common identity.77 Yet it is also in cases of rights 
claiming where the legibility of the fact of one’s own personal or collective identity becomes 
increasingly important for making claims to political rights and to political sovereignty. Some 
critique theories of identity that emphasize the necessary incompleteness, or indeterminacy of 
identity for “positively undermining emancipatory politics [and] with threatening the theoretical 
and strategic resources essential to responding to and transforming relations of inequality and 
injustice”78. Perhaps Israeli exceptionalism is a good example of why some people feel this way. 
However, I do not think this is the fault of these theories of identity in principle, but rather 
certain structural factors that we can identify, such as the Israeli monopoly on discourse. These 
factors explain how some emancipatory politics are often undermined in this way, while other 
privileged claims to sovereignty continue to persist.  
  With this in mind I would like to critically engage the unequal access that Palestinian 
and Israeli subjects have to legibility homogenous people and as a people deserving of political 
sovereignty. The former is particularly important in the Israeli Palestinian conflict, where 
sovereignty is often talked of in ethnic and racial terms. Some political norms have become tied 
to cultural norms in paradoxical ways. Take for example, the misnomer that identifies the state’s 
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Jewish character as a predicate of its “democratic character.” This identification demonstrates 
how certain people and states have colonized principles and practices, which are often 
recognized for their attempt to destabililize rigid articulations of identity. This phenomenon is 
demonstrated by the “clash of civilizations” thesis, which identifies “democracy,” among other 
political norms, to be a culturally specific phenomenon, but then bolsters the supremacy of 
western culture by merit of democratic theory’s characteristic claim to universality and plurality. 
Many of the theories of subject and sovereignty discussed in this paper attempt to show how the 
operation of pluralistic and democratic entities is haunted by the practices of sovereignty that 
pluralism and democracy are meant to do away with. However, this continues to privilege certain 
political norms (such as democracy and pluralism) that cannot easily if at all be detached from 
cultural norms, or from the sovereign practices that exceed those political norms.  
 So, in discussing the differences in how Israeli and Palestinian articulations of 
sovereignty are structured according to cultural and political norms, I will continue to engage 
theories of identity and sovereignty that wish to challenge the determinacy and completeness of 
the subject. More specifically, I am interested in those theorists that recognize and deal with an 
intimacy between the target of critique and the subject who is poised to subvert or challenge that 
object of critique, and thus an intimacy between practices of self-determination and practices of 
subjection. Given this seemingly inescapable duality, we are faced with the question of whether 
it is possible to, and whether it is efficacious to attempt to separate the two. This question 
proliferates a number of ethical questions regarding the relationship between theory and praxis.  
 We remain faced with certain problems regarding attempts to theorize exceptionalism so 
as to effectively challenge it. These theories, which see a potential for radical resignification in 
the hybridity or the enactive quality of identity, tend to remain attached to progressive 
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shibboleths, which, far from challenging the binary between Israelis and Palestinians, would 
simply abstract from the difference which structures Israeli and Palestinian claims. By theorizing 
exceptionalism in order to recognize and normalize the indeterminacy between the exception and 
the norm already at play, one risks undermining the recognizability of certain claims for 
individual rights and collective sovereignty while at the same time freeing other previously 
recognized identities and sovereignties from the obligation to their own claims of exceptionality. 
With this in mind I would like to finish my analysis of exceptionalism as it operates through 




















Political Exceptionalism and the “failure” of Israeli Democracy: Israeli Sovereignty as 
Operating in Relation to Political Norms  
         In the case of Israel Palestine it is increasingly difficult to separate cultural and political 
norms, and so I will attempt to discuss specifically the operation of political norms without 
repeating myself too much. By political norms, I refer to terms by which certain states and 
subjects are said to conform to certain political identities. Specifically, I am interested in the 
qualification of the Israeli state as progressive and/or democratic, and Israeli identity as 
singularly multicultural and diasporic. In describing Israeli exceptionalism, it has been partially 
priority to describe in detail the principles on which Israeli sovereignty is supposedly made 
contingent. Lawfulness, the determinacy of borders, the purity of Jewish character, and finally a 
democratic and progressive ethos are articulated as the principles and conditions of Israeli 
sovereignty. I have attempted to demonstrate in these cases, the actual operation of sovereignty 
makes unintelligible those conditions and denigrates those principles, and yet in some sense 
conditions the continued operation and re-articulation of sovereignty. Indeed, the authoritarian 
acts of the Israeli state continue to be justified in the name of popular sovereignty, or democracy. 
Consequently, these acts evacuate that language of their meaning and political efficacy, at least 
for some. Palestinians, attempting to articulate “legitimate” modes of popular sovereignty as 
resistance to occupation, are made more dependent on that language that the Israeli state has 
already exceeded.79 Let us take for example the increasingly ubiquitous and unquestioned truism 
that Israel is both Jewish and Democratic. This claim plays strategically with the indeterminate 
spaces between the exception and the norm. “Israel,” write Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Abigail B. 
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Bakan “is commonly identified as a state without comparison, framed in international politics as 
the only “Jewish” state, and one that is claimed to be exceptionally “democratic” in the context 
of the Middle East”80. Although democratic popular sovereignty is at times valorized on the 
condition of its universality and its unconditional inclusiveness, some of us remain more 
democratic than others. Inclusiveness as a marker of identity becomes appropriated for the sake 
of exclusive practices of political sovereignty and of cultural, ethnic, and racial supremacy. 
         The coding of Palestinians as fundamentalist, reactionary sets certain standards of 
“legitimate” Palestinian statehood and representation. Consequently Palestinian claims for self-
determination are painted as unpragmatic and outlandish claims and therefore illegitimate.81 
Israel is not subject to these same expectations, while they still profit from the conceit of the 
Israeli state as a paradigm of liberal statehood in an otherwise illiberal environment. A double 
standard is also demonstrated by the expectations placed on non Jewish Arab representatives of 
Israel within the Knesset. Their presence perhaps serves as an avatar of Israeli democracy, 
popular sovereignty, and a general ethos of inclusiveness. Yet it is through that very mechanism 
of “inclusion” and “democratic representation” that channels of Palestinian representation are 
captured as that which can be cited to prove the inefficacy of Palestinian popular sovereignty, 
and prove the inviolability of Israeli popular sovereignty. According to Israeli domestic law, all 
Arab representatives in the Knesset and all Arab political parties can be rejected if they do not 
reject the Zionist definition of Israel as a “Jewish State”82. Consequently “legitimate” forms 
Palestinian representation in fact “confine legitimate change to the boundaries defined by the 
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Zionist consensus and anchor them in constitutional law”83. Yet in doing so Palestinian 
representatives are immediately alienated from their position as representatives. Popular 
representation for the Arab citizens of Israel is undercut by the very terms of that representation 
being recognized.   
        Joseph Massad suggests that  “If we were to use a metaphor in order to describe the 
hegemonic Western discourse vis-a-vis Palestinians, we would see it as a discursive space that 
places Palestinians on its border, faced with checkpoints that mainly keep us out but do allow 
some entry.”84 The image of the checkpoint is useful insofar as it demonstrates a parallel 
between how political subjects are produced materially and how those subjects are produced 
discursively. The checkpoint marks a liminal space and leaky space. It is a space where 
sovereignty operates in a permanent state of incompletion, in the failure for it to actualize its own 
goals, and so as not to negate the foil of its existence. In this space the qualities and practices that 
are at times valorized by many post-modern thinkers appear to be implicated in the violation of 
individual subjects. However, these theorists maintain that it is for this very reason that such 
qualities describe the most strategic way to negotiate effectively with relations of domination. A 
politics that attempts to embrace he notion of sovereignty in this way, can be read as hopeful, 
perhaps to a fault. If sovereignty is already operating in a state of its own incompleteness, then 
the terms by which sovereignty is defined are to some extent in contest.  Karen Zivi writes that it 
is because the assertion of personal and collective sovereignty increasingly exceeds the norms 
through which it presents itself, that “terms and norms can be invoked and cited in ways that 
exceed and help shift dominant ways of thinking, being and doing. This makes a performative 
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politics a hopeful politics”85. We have also seen however, that a politics of this kind is implicated 
in the ability of sovereignties and the bearers of particular identities to not only exceed the norms 
of sovereignty or identity, but to attempt to normalize such exceptions in the name of their own 
legibility as that sovereignty or identity.  This duality is well demonstrated by Derrida’s writing 
on sovereignty and democracy.  
 I would like to focus on the relation between sovereignty and democracy. Democracy is 
asserted as a practice of politics that challenges the kind of unconditional sovereignty, which in 
the case of Israel, has been licensed by such assertions. In Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, 
Derrida writes on the contemporary phenomenon of the “Rogue State” (État Voyou), that asserts 
sovereignty through the manipulation of political norms that are antithetical to the way in which 
sovereignty continues to operate. These states are characteristic for “appearing not to respect the 
mandates of international law, the prevailing rules and force of law of international deontology, 
such as the so-called legitimate and law-abiding states that interpret them in accordance with 
their own interests”86. Exceptionalism demonstrates the kind of roguishness that Derrida argues 
to be ubiquitous in self-declared “democratic” states.  
 Derrida’s describes there to be an intimacy between sovereignty and democracy that is 
aporetic, partially because democracy, asserts its sovereignty in under and in the name of an 
identity that is often corrupted by its very assertion. Yet, Derrida implies that for this reason the 
relationship between democracy and sovereignty is integral to the persistence of both. The 
concept of democracy has always been controversial for the reason that it is difficult, as Derrida 
points out, “to distinguish, with regard to free will, between the good of democratic freedom or 
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liberty and the evil of democratic license”87. Despite the fact that the term “democracy” is often 
articulated as a universal and unconditionally inclusive concept, the presentation of Israeli policy 
as an attempt to protect or preserve democracy implies that democracy can only be effective 
when it is bounded. This is odd given that those same policies licensed in the name of preserving 
democracy further disrupt the boundedness of Israeli sovereignty. The operation of sovereignty 
becomes an obstacle to the actualization of truly democratic practice, although democracy is 
understood as necessarily linked to some sort of sovereignty through which it can be actualized. 
Thus democracy continues to be asserted by sovereign nations as an incomplete project, as a 
promise for something that is yet to come. Yet, this promise is attractive for the very reason that 
it refuses to restrict itself to any conditions based on previous promises, and thus remains 
attached to a sovereignty that exceeds the political norm to which it fails to conform. Derrida 
agrees, further arguing that the will of people can only be effectively represented by some 
sovereignty, which is not directly reducible to the people, and which is in some sense outside of 
the people, an “other,” of the people88, but that cannot be truly exorcised from the people in the 
attempt to bring about Democracy. So, although Democracy stakes its claim to sovereignty on its 
identification with democracy, democratic practices remain implicated in practices of exclusion, 
surveillance, security and larger structures which simultaneously signify the failure of 
democratic practice, and the promise for a principled democratic practice.  
 This account is persuasive, but Derrida’s use of the abstract “other” problematically 
suggests a symmetry that obscures the fundamentally asymmetrical dynamics of exceptionalism. 
This usage also abstracts from the difference between more principled forms of democratic 
practices, and what I observe to be clear perversions of democracy. Indeed, I agree with Derrida 
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that democracy often operates on its own threshold, but that does not mean we can come to say 
that certain states are “democratic” for the very reason that they are not democratic. Both the 
Israeli settler and the Palestinian are examples of border figures, in whose name Israeli 
sovereignty is articulated. This occurs despite that those figures are conditioned at the threshold 
of Israeli sovereignty by its very operations. However, to equate the Israeli Settler with the 
Palestinian in this case is problematic, despite the fact that Derrida abstracts from this difference 
in order to critique state exceptionalism.  
 For Derrida, popular sovereignty enables self-determination.  In order for a subject, 
(whether personal or collective), to be its self, and to actualize its self-determination, that subject 
must exceed its self in the process. Consequently, to assert collective self-determination is to 
assert a sovereignty of the people that must necessarily exceeds the people. Derrida writes that, 
“there is no freedom without ipseity and, vice versa, no ipseity without freedom—and, thus, 
without a certain sovereignty”89. The borders of identity through where the sovereignty of states 
and subjects is asserted are necessarily exceeded by the capacity to protect or defend those 
borders. Thus ipseity, or self-identity is exceeded by self-identification. This is what the 
exceptional state seeks to normalize. It seeks to maintain the conceit of its exceptionality despite 
the fact the assertion of sovereignty necessarily makes indeterminate the distinction between the 
exception and the norm. Yet, if we affirm Derrida’s general point on inevitable disjointedness of 
personal sovereignty and self-determination, then the claim to the rights of Palestinians or the 
right to a Palestinian state, which can be posed as a challenge to Israeli exceptionalism, may 
appear inevitably self-undermining for the same reason that Israeli exceptionalism continues to 
persist. I would argue that this is the case because of how Palestinians are expected to prove their 
political rights in ways that are not expected of Israelis.  
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 Derrida challenges teleological narratives of the subject so as to understand how 
exceptionalism can be a constitutive force. He writes that self hood or “ipseity” is, among other 
things, enactive “inasmuch as this latter still implies a power for some “I” guaranteed by 
conventions that neutralize the pure eventfulness of the event, and inasmuch as the eventfulness 
of the to-come exceeds this sphere of the performative”90. This “to come” is integral to Derrida’s 
critique of contemporary so-called democratic sovereignty. To continue to act in the name of that 
which is denigrated by those actions is for Derrida a quality of democratic popular sovereignty. 
But then again, it is unclear whether Derrida’s deconstruction of popular democratic sovereignty 
is a normative critique.  
 There is a paradox at the heart of democratic popular sovereignty, which is both 
necessary for its operation and the cause of its seemingly inevitable failure. This problem mirrors 
the paradox of self-identification and self-determination of the “I” or “We” that exceeds or fails 
to conform to the norms of its own determination and identification. Yet if this is the case than 
how can these norms continue to carry any meaning? If a democracy necessarily is effective for 
the reason that it isn’t a democracy than why are we still using the term? To this Derrida would 
perhaps respond with the claim that democratic sovereign both suffer from and are conditioned 
by a certain “autoimmunity,” and that consequently, democracy comes in the form of a promise, 
and as something that remains as that which is “to come.” Derrida writes that sovereignty “is 
always in the process of positing itself by refusing itself by denying of disavowing itself; it is 
always in the process of autoimmunizing itself, or betraying itself by betraying the democracy 
that nonetheless can never do without it.”91 I wonder if it is possible, with Derrida’ approach, to 
be supportive yet critical of the promise of an Israeli/Palestinian state that democratically 
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represents its respective people (whatever that means), in ways which do not enforce the double 
standard that Palestinians are subjected to? I am not sure, but to answer this question one must 
first take into account the fact that there exists certain discursive norms that already privilege as 
paradigmatically conforming to and thus superior to those norms.  Consequently, identification 
as “democratic” can be employed to rhetorically license the violent and the anti-democratic 
practices of the Israeli state and of some of its citizens. Derrida’s writing can be read as both 
apologizing for the failure of democracy, and chastising current “democracies” for not being 
accountable to their identification as democratic. Because of this of this, it becomes increasingly 
important to take into account the Israeli monopoly on discourse and to take into account those 
structural factors that determine how sovereignty comes to be recognized according to political 
norms, and to what extent states and subjects are dependent on conforming to those norms.   
 Derrida depicts a sovereign who operates by playing with the own question of his 
existence or non-existence and thus exists—like the settlements--in a state of “temporary 
permanence.” This is similar to Agamben, who depicts a sovereign that is brought about and thus 
operates on the threshold of its own dissolution, insofar as the Agambenian sovereign 
consistently operates by exceeding the norms of its intelligibility. However, for Derrida, this fact 
is not fundamental to sovereignty, and this marks a major contrast with Agamben. I would agree, 
and argue that if sovereignty appropriates the condition of its dissolution as a condition of its 
own operation, that this is only effective if sovereignty is already taken given. With this in mind, 
it is possible to recognize how sovereignty persists under Israeli exceptionalism, while also 
recognizing how Palestinian claims to sovereignty remain unrecognized. We could recognize this 
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failure to be a result, not of the failure of Palestinians to conform to the terms of political 
intelligibility, but of what Joseph Massad calls “the limits of racialized discourse.”92  
 If we follow Derrida’s approach, then Democracy remains inextricably tied to the 
sovereign who both attempts to bring about and fails to conform to democracy in principle. The 
capacity for certain political formations to persist under the banner of Democratic practice, is 
necessarily tied to sovereignty’s disjunction from the terms by which it identifies itself.  And in a 
clear way this is a good thing, as it is the failure of the Israeli state to live up to the principles it 
wields as a rhetorical weapon against Palestinian claims for self-determination that informs the 
space for critique. If exceptionalist states like Israel remain in some way haunted by the own 
promise of democracy, or haunted by the others excluded in the name of that promise, then a 
emancipatory politics would necessarily require calling attention to this fact, and exposing the 
paradox at play. However, to do so would remain tied to an ideal of democratic practice, and to a 
notion of democratic sovereignty without the stakes of sovereignty. This is an ideal that has 
already become an instrument of state exceptionalism, and one which already reflects Israeli 
privilege.  
 Derrida is clear that his ideas cannot, and should not be easily appropriated for the sake 
of emancipatory politics. His critique targets all “militant or interminable political critique”93. 
Instead we find the hope for democracy in the failure of democratic practice itself, because it is 
failure that incites the outlawry that progress requires. For Derrida, democracy cannot exist 
without that taste for roguishness that the Israeli government demonstrates94. In this sense, we 
return to the same problem encountered by Butler’s albeit cautious celebration of hybridity and 
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by post-modern theories of subject and sovereignty generally. To advocate for practices that play 
with the distinction between the exception and the norm, in ways already practiced by sovereign 
states and subjects, is to call attention to the unfair ethical injunction for some subjects and 
sovereign states to remain obligated to those norms. However it does not necessarily challenge 
the force of those norms more than it does further erode the capacity for marginalized subjects to 
be recognized according to them.  
  A theory of politics a long these lines must take into account the extent to which 
disjointed practices of subjectivity and sovereignty are insulated by existing asymmetries of 
legibility. For those claiming political rights, the extent to which the success of such claims is 
bolstered and not undermined by its enactive character, is ultimately structured by norms of 
recognition that are not immanent to the claims themselves. So on the one hand, the claims to the 
exceptional rights of the Israeli state and Israeli citizens can be bolstered by claims of 
normativity (“we are all Israelis”) without undermining the special treatment that Israel receives 
on the basis of its exceptionality. In contrast, the attempt to make Palestinian claims to political 
rights efficacious, by arguing the exceptionality of Palestinian experience or, by comparing the 
Palestinian experience to the Jewish experience according to certain norms, are both read as anti-
Semitic. This is because both “threaten” Israeli exceptionalism.  
 I would argue that those theories that purport to challenge the link between the political 
efficacy of cultural and political norms, and the integrity of those norms, can be useful tools for 
maintaining a sovereignty that is purportedly contingent on one’s capacity or ability to conform 
to those norms. The fostering of vigilantism and outlawry, the appropriation of Arab identity in 
the articulation of Israeli identity as multicultural, and denigration of democracy in practice in 
the name of a democracy that remains ethnically and racially coded all demonstrate the 
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incorporation of that which is stated to be exterior, for the sake of a sovereignty and identity 
founded in practices of excluding the “other.” However, these unfortunate perversions of what, 
for many would constitute a progressive or even emancipatory politics, cannot be reduced to any 
abstract philosophical issue of sovereignty as enactive, or as fractured and incomplete. This, I 
would argue, is Agamben’s fatal flaw. Instead they should be contextualized by the normative 






















 In their introduction to The Subject and the Political, Jenny Edkins, and Veronique Pin-
Fat observe that in poststructuralist though the “sovereign individual” 
becomes the incomplete, impossible subject, and “sovereignty” is brought into question. There 
are no settled identities; the subject never achieves the completion or wholeness toward which it 
strives. It remains haunted by that which has to be excluded for subjectivity to be constituted in 
the first place. This subject has no respect for sovereignty or its linearities: that which is placed 
on the outside-the other-turns out to be on the inside after all. In the process, time itself is 
distorted. In this pictures, the subject is always in the process of being constituted; there is no 
point at which however briefly, the performance is finished.95  
 
 I find this description of the post-structural political subject to resonate with my own 
account of exceptionalism in several ways: the fact that sovereignty increasingly operates both 
within and without the markers of its own legibility, and the fact that subjects increasingly 
articulate their personal sovereignty on the borders of legal, cultural and political belonging. The 
relationship between subject and sovereignty echoes across scales of political constellations. The 
“sovereign individual” could signify both the individual citizen subject or the collective and 
bounded Subject that is the modern nation state. Both appear as “rogues,” with a certain 
“disrespect” for the norms of their own identification. As both exceed the limits of their identity 
as states and subjects in their assertions of sovereignty, there remains both a strong link and a 
strong disjunction between what sovereignty is and what sovereignty does. Consequently, what 
sovereignty “is” increasingly appears as a performance that has no ending, and as an operation 
that persists through a state of its own precarity. This is correlative with the quality of temporary 
permanence through which the sovereignty of states and identities is continually asserted. The 
operations of contemporary sovereignty disrupt chronologies by which those sovereign entities 
are said to exist. As a result states are able to deploy the threat of their own dissolution or the 
promise of their self-actualization, (according to certain norms), as the condition of their own 
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operations. In a sense, sovereignty is never “itself,” but rather always operates by exceeding or 
failing to conform to the norms by which one is said to be sovereign.  
 However, this description unfortunately misses the asymmetry implicit in this condition. 
What marks the difference between failure and refusal when it comes to the operations of 
sovereign entities? What is the difference between the refusal of Israelis to conform to the 
political norms that already take their rights as given, and the failure of Palestinians to conform 
to the political from which they are already excluded? What is the difference between the 
temporary permanence of Israeli occupation, and the always-provisional authority of Palestinian 
sovereignty? In Agamben’s description of sovereignty, this difference is reduced to the 
incontestable distinction between the sovereign and the sacred man despite the fact that 
sovereignty appears persistent for the reason that the difference between them remains in contest 
and in flux. Indeed, Zionist narratives are politically efficacious insofar as they oscillate between 
depiction of the Israeli state as both threatened and inviolable. The Agambenian sovereign is 
tactical because he operates through exceptionalism, and because he asserts himself outside of 
the norms through which his “self” is made legible. And yet, if Agamben reduces this 
fragmented quality of the sovereign to a metaphysical quality intrinsic to sovereignty, then how 
can there still be a strategic distinction between what sovereignty is and what sovereignty does?  
Agamben’s approach undercuts all possibilities of strategizing against exceptionalism as there is 
no named distinction between sovereignty is and what sovereignty does, despite the fact that his 
theory appears radical for the very reason that there is demonstrated a disjunction between the 
two.  
 Sovereignty remains effective partially because it is enactive, and thus is consistently 
disclosed through certain norms but can never be kept accountable to those norms. And, when 
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sovereignty increasingly asserts this exceptionality of a norm of its own operations, then it 
becomes increasingly difficult keep sovereignty accountable. From where does one lodge an 
effective critique of exceptoinalism, if exceptionalism operates by including what exists outside 
of it, in the form of the exception, as a norm? Further, how does one recognize the indeterminacy 
of those binaries that supposedly distinguish Israeli sovereignty, without obfuscating the 
structural violence experienced by those excluded from Israeli privilege?  
 Derrida’s writing on democracy shows that within the context of political norms, there 
exists a disjunction between the integrity of the identity of states and subjects, and the force 
behind the assertion of those identities. In the Israel’s self-identification as “democratic,” this site 
of disjunction marks both the perversion of democratic practice but also the best opportunity for 
democracy to continue on into the future. Butler’s writing on a Jewish critique of Zionism shows 
how, in the context of cultural norms, this disjunction marks both the persistence of Jewish 
exceptionality, and the space through which that exceptionality can be effectively challenged. 
Implicit in Butler’s attempt to articulate a “post-Zionist” position is both an inability to escape 
and a capacity to subvert from within Zionist discourse. This term “post-Zionist” marks a future 
failure to escape the terms of its own object of critique, but it also signifies a promise to 
revolutionize that object of critique. Derrida, who explicitly critiques radical polemics, 
understands that as political norms are increasingly identified through the capacity to exceed 
norms, it becomes impossible, from the perspective of critical theory, to lodge a critique free 
from the indeterminacy of exception and norm. While Agamben seems to unreasonably hold out 
for a radical philosophy that transcends this problem, Butler and Derrida are perhaps to easily 
willing to forgive critical theory for its failures.  
 What is to be done when democracy, and diaspora become identities through which the 
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Israeli state attempts to justify its xenophobic and authoritarian policies? Can those concepts be 
used critically without privileging the identities that colonize them? Regardless of whether this 
can or should be done, I feel generally uncomfortable holding Palestinian sovereignty to the 
same standards to which I hold Israeli sovereignty. This may seem contradictory given the fact 
that much of this paper has been an attempt to critique the exceptional status granted to the 
Israeli state and to Israeli subjects. Yet, I find myself ready to support claims for Palestinian 
sovereignty and forgive those claims for their “problematic aspects,” while I am still critical of 
Israeli sovereignty, even in its most apologetic forms. I find this approach strategic in because it 
recognizes that Palestinian access to agency within cultural and political norms is minimal in 
contrast to the privilege of Israeli voices. Similarly, I feel more inclined to celebrate Palestinian 
lawlessness or forgive violence against Israeli institutions as a necessary response to the already 
existing indeterminacy between exception and law, because Palestinians do in no way exert the 
same agency that Israelis do in the context of that indeterminacy.  
 Perhaps my own practices of critique are inconsistent. They may appear to be an arbitrary 
curbing of my own theoretical insights for the sake of my own standards of solidarity. This is 
partially true, although I have come to this position as a result of my theoretical investigations. 
Israeli claims to political sovereignty increasingly assert the unconditionality of those claims as a 
norm of Israeli statehood, and consequently, critical theorists are constantly asked to curb their 
own critical principles for the sake of showing solidarity with the Israeli state. Inversely, 
Palestinian claims are always conditional, and are always expected to conform to certain norms 
of political intelligibility. By recognizing this fact, I cannot necessarily close the gulf between 
what theory says and what theory can do. Regardless, I hope that doing so will shed light on the 
structural factors (both material and discursive) that effect but are in no way immanent to my 
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capacity to critique them. So, at times, I support Palestinian claims in manners that may verge on 
the unconditional. If I do, it is because I have been asked to do so, because Palestinians are faced 
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